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OUTSOURCING PRIVACY
Ari Ezra Waldman*
INTRODUCTION
Managerialism is an ideological framework that calls for institutions to
be organized around the values of efficiency, productivity, and innovation. 1 It
prioritizes the logics of efficient management over social welfare, inclusivity,
and egalitarianism. Managerialized governmental institutions are evaluated
as if they are for-profit businesses. Managerialized corporations are focused
on leanness and efficiency rather than, say, social responsibility or providing
employees with adequate salaries and benefits. 2
In her book, Between Truth and Power, Julie Cohen deftly describes how
managerial values and practices in judicial and regulatory institutions have
helped entrench the power of corporations in the information economy. 3 For
example, managerialized judicial processes, like expedited discovery rules
and the pressure to settle rather than litigate claims, make it difficult for
privacy plaintiffs to seek justice through the courts. 4 Courts, too, have been
eager to outsource their adjudicative responsibilities to entities outside the
© 2021 Ari Ezra Waldman. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Publication in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and Computer Science and Director, Center for Law, Innovation,
and Creativity, Northeastern University School of Law and Khoury College of Computer
Sciences. PhD, Columbia University; JD, Harvard Law School. Special thanks to Julie
Cohen, whose brilliant and insightful work consistently and ceaselessly inspires my own.
Thanks also to Danielle Keats Citron, Woodrow Hartzog, Margot Kaminski, Orly Lobel, Bill
McGeveran, Mark McKenna, Deirdre Mulligan, Frank Pasquale, and Neil Richards, as well
as the editors of the Notre Dame Law Review Reflection. All errors—none of which have been
outsourced—are my own.
1 JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 144–45 (2019).
2 Id. at 145.
3 Id. at 154–67. I am using the phrase “information industry” to refer to companies
that profit off the data they collect from their customers or internet and technology users
in general. It includes both Big Tech—Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft—
as well as data brokers and companies—like those in retail and finance—who may have
developed with a primary focus elsewhere but nonetheless reap profits from the collection,
processing, and commodification of information about us.
4 See id. at 154.
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judicial process in order to make litigating claims more efficient: they enforce
boilerplate forced arbitration clauses that remove claims from courts entirely;5
rely on settlements or consent decrees that deputize regulated entities to
monitor and police themselves; 6 and outsource judicial decisionmaking to
mediators and arbitrators who hear evidence, consider legal arguments, and
issue binding orders.7
Just like managerialized judicial institutions are making it more difficult
for individuals to vindicate their rights against modern corporations
generally, managerialism in the privacy space is also undermining the ability
of privacy law to rein in excessive corporate data extraction. Managerialized
privacy compliance focuses on minimizing the law’s impact on product
innovation rather than on substantive adherence to the goals of privacy law.
As such, the information industry has created compliance structures and
mechanisms—policies, offices, impact assessments, audits, trainings, and so
forth—that bear resemblance to legal structures, but are actually compliance
in name only.8 They are, to use Lauren Edelman’s phrase, merely symbolic,
standing in place of actual adherence to privacy law and leveraged as
misleading evidence of compliance as data-extractive behavior continues
unabated behind the scenes.9 Managerialized regulatory institutions are far
more likely to defer to these merely symbolic compliance mechanisms than
those focused on vindicating the rights of consumers: they are easy heuristics,
they make adjudication simple, they permit a light regulatory touch, and they
do not stand in the way of private innovation. As Cohen argues persuasively,
managerialized legal structures are complicit in the ballooning and
unaccountable power of the information industry.10
An underappreciated part of the narrative of privacy managerialism—
and the focus of this Essay—is the information industry’s increasing tendency
to outsource privacy compliance responsibilities to technology vendors. In
the last three years alone, the International Association of Privacy
Professionals (IAPP) has identified more than 250 companies in the privacy

5
6
7

Id. at 155–56.
See id. at 161–63.
See, e.g., CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL: THE POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 16–43 (2016); Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise
and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 20
(2003) (binding arbitration takes away the opportunity for a trial); Jean R. Sternlight,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh
Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5
(1997).
8 Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 773, 776–77
(2020) [hereinafter Waldman, Privacy Law’s].
9 See LAUREN EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC
CIVIL RIGHTS 32 (2016).
10 COHEN, supra note 1, at 154–64.
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technology vendor market.11 These companies market their products as tools
to help companies comply with new privacy laws like the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR),12 with consent orders from the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC),13 and with other privacy rules from around the world.
They do so by building compliance templates, pre-completed assessment
forms, and monitoring consents, among many other things. As such, many of
these companies are doing far more than helping companies identify the data
they have or answer data access requests; many of them are instantiating their
own definitions and interpretations of complex privacy laws into the
technologies they create and doing so only with managerial values in mind.
This undermines privacy law in four ways: it creates asymmetry between large
technology companies and their smaller competitors, it makes privacy law
underinclusive by limiting it to those requirements that can be written into
code, it erodes expertise by outsourcing human work to artificial intelligence
and automated systems, and it creates a “black box” that undermines
accountability.
This Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I create a partial taxonomy of
privacy technology vendors. The purpose of this section is to use primary
source material from the vendors themselves to show that some of them are
necessarily interpreting legal requirements and coding them into their
products, even when they suggest they aren’t. Part II teases out the
implications of privacy managerialism and privacy compliance outsourcing,
in particular, focusing on the four primary concerns of asymmetry,
underinclusiveness, expertise, and accountability. The Essay concludes on a
cautionary note: if it is ever legitimate, outsourcing is traditionally most often
used for corporate functions and responsibilities that “lie outside the firm’s
core . . . competencies.”14 What does it say about companies in the
information industry, many of which remind us that our “privacy is
important” to them, and privacy professionals’ trade organizations like the
IAPP, that they are so eager to outsource their privacy compliance
responsibilities? Outsourcing privacy is, therefore, not only an example of
privacy managerialism, but also a symptom of privacy’s systematic
marginalization throughout the information industry.

11 IAPP, 2019 PRIVACY TECH VENDOR REPORT 3–4 (V.3.2 ed. 2019),
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/2019TechVendorReport.pdf [hereinafter
TECH VENDOR REPORT].
12 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016, On the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR].
13 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 606–09 (2014).
14 COHEN, supra note 1, at 157.
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PRIVACY TECHNOLOGY VENDORS

Outsourcing usually involves shifting a specific, limited corporate activity
that used to be done in-house to a third party because that third party can do
it more efficiently and less expensively.15 Routine functions—custodial,
catering, and security, among many others—as well as highly specialized
tasks—accounting, human resources, and informational technology, for
example—are often outsourced when they are outside the “core
competencies” of the firm. 16 This includes legal tasks as well, like when
companies hire outside litigators and legal counselors. Increasingly, though,
as technology outsourcing becomes more widespread in general, companies
in the information industry are outsourcing legal and quasi-legal decisions to
algorithmic systems, from content moderation to privacy compliance. 17
The IAPP has identified ten categories of tasks performed by privacy
technology vendors: assessment management, which involves automating
privacy impact assessments and demonstrating compliance; consent
management, which helps companies ask for and track user consents;
incident response, which assists with responding to data breaches; privacy
information management, which summarizes privacy law developments; deidentification and pseudonymization, which allow companies to process data;
data mapping, which helps companies identify how their data is being used;
website scanning, which reviews company websites to determine what kind of
trackers they’re using; activity monitoring, which tracks who has access to what
data; data discovery, which tells companies what information they have; and
enterprise communications, which facilitate internal communications to
avoid leaks.18 Of the 259 vendors profiled in its 2019 Privacy Tech Vendor
Report, none do all of these tasks, three report that they can perform nine of
them, and seventy-two do only one of them. The most common task
performed by technology vendors is data mapping (114); the fewest vendors
do website scanning (30).19
But this taxonomy elides what makes this vendor market troublesome.
In outsourcing privacy compliance, the information industry is not just
shifting responsibilities. It is changing the medium through which special
kinds of responsibilities—interpretation and implementation of legal rules—
are performed—namely, from humans to technology.
15 See Michael Quinlan, Labour Market Restructuring in Industrialised Societies: An
Overview, 9 ECON. & LAB. RELS. REV. 1, 12 (1998).
16 See James Brian Quinn, Strategic Outsourcing: Leveraging Knowledge Capabilities,
SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 1999, at 9, 12; Peter Gottschalk & Hans Solli-Saether, Critical
Success Factors from IT Outsourcing Theories: An Empirical Study, 105 INDUS. MGMT. & DATA
SYS. 685, 686 (2005).
17 See, e.g., Evelyn Douek, Governing Online Speech: From “Posts-As-Trumps” to
Proportionality & Probability, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3679607.
18 See TECH VENDOR REPORT, supra note 11, at 5.
19 Id. at 11–19.
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JLINC Labs, for example, claims its consent management software
“makes it easy to comply with any data-related legislation.”20 Nymity’s privacy
compliance technology claims that it is “GDPR Ready” and helps
“organizations attain, maintain and demonstrate ongoing compliance.” 21
FairWarning, which markets privacy and security solutions to health care
providers, claims, without evidence, that its program fully complies with
Article 25 of the GDPR and “fully addresses” five of the Phase 2 HIPAA Audit
protocol elements and “partially addresses” twenty-six more.22 ZLTech also
offers “GDPR Ready Solutions,” and explicitly claims that its tools to identify,
minimize, and govern personal data uses will make clients compliant with
multiple parts of the GDPR. 23 Market puffery or not, these claims suggest that
compliance vendors are instantiating particular visions of what the law
requires into their technologies.

20 Ari Waldman, When We Outsource Privacy Compliance, We May Undermine Privacy
Protection, PROMARKET (Apr. 15, 2019), https://promarket.org/2019/04/15/when-weoutsource-privacy-compliance-we-may-undermine-privacy-protection/.
21 See
NYMITY,
PRIVACY
COMPLIANCE
SOFTWARE,
https://web.archive.org/web/20180905234153/https://info.nymity.com/hubfs/Nymity%
20Story/Nymity%20Story.pdf?pdf=Nymity-Story (last visited Apr. 24, 2021). See generally
How Technology Can Help Achieve GDPR Compliance?, RISKPIN (June 25, 2018),
http://blog.riskpin.com/2018/06/25/how-technology-can-help-achieve-gdprcompliance/ (“GDPR Compliance tools like Nymity . . . help organisations keep abreast of
upcoming compliance changes making them better prepared to meet compliance
requirements.”); NYMITY, FRAMEWORK FOR DEMONSTRABLE GDPR COMPLIANCE (2018),
https://info.nymity.com/hubfs/Landing%20Pages/GDPR%20Toolkit/Accountability_Ro
admap_for_Demonstrable_GDPR_Compliance.pdf (detailing specific GDPR Articles,
including Articles 15 (right of access), 17 (right to erasure, or “right to be forgotten”), 18
(right to restriction of processing), 25 (right to privacy by design and by default), 30
(reporting), and 32 (security of processing)). See also NYMITY, REPORTING ON GDPR
COMPLIANCE
9
(2018),
https://info.nymity.com/hubfs/Landing%20Pages/Reporting%20on%20GDPR%20Com
pliance/Nymity%20Regulator%20Ready%20Reporting%20Whitepaper-%2020180713.pdf
(implying use of toolkit will comply with Article 30 reporting requirements).
22 See
IMPRIVATA, IMPRIVATA FAIRWARNING MAPPING TO GDPR 2,
https://www.imprivata.com/resources/whitepapers/how-fairwarning-helps-you-meet-gdpr
(last visited Apr. 24, 2021); IMPRIVATA, IMPRIVATA FAIRWARNING CAPABILITIES MAPPING TO
HIPAA 1, https://www.imprivata.com/resources/whitepapers/how-fairwarning-fulfills-onhipaa (last visited Apr. 24, 2021); see also OCR Launches Phase 2 of HIPAA Audit Program,
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/complianceenforcement/audit/phase2announcement/index.html?language=es (noting that Phase 2
audits ensure that entities covered by HIPAA comply with “Privacy, Security, and Breach
Notification Rules”).
23 ZL Technologies Announces GDPR Ready Solutions, ZLTECH (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.zlti.com/press-releases/zl-technologies-announces-gdpr-ready-solutions.
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A. Assessment Management
Assessment management software, provided by 103 companies on the
IAPP’s list, can automate the day-to-day work of privacy programs, including
operationalizing privacy impact assessments (PIAs), training employees, and
completing and submitting compliance documents to regulators. 24 PIAs, first
deployed in the government context, are formal “analys[es] of how personally
identifiable information is collected, used, [and] shared.” 25 The 2002 EGovernment Act requires all federal agencies to conduct and issue PIAs “for
all new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or
disseminates personally identifiable information,”26 and they are expressly
required by the GDPR.27 The FTC also requires regulated entities to engage
in ongoing monitoring and reporting for up to twenty years after signing a
consent decree.28
That means that PIAs have to meet some legal criteria to constitute
compliance. But, as several scholars have noted, privacy law is rather vague
on this point, rarely stating PIA and other requirements explicitly and
precisely.29
Therefore, outsourced PIAs necessarily reflect vendor
interpretations of unclear legal rules. If they want to comply with the law, they
have to understand provisions in the GDPR and in FTC consent decrees, as
well as integrate guidance from the Data Protection Board and any recent
outcomes of investigations and litigations. According to the IAPP, although
most companies use their in-house legal team to conduct PIAs, fifteen percent
use a vendor-designed template that may be different than ones created by

24 See TECH VENDOR REPORT, supra note 11, at 5–7.
25 Privacy Impact Assessments, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/siteinformation/privacy-policy/privacy-impact-assessments (last visited Apr. 24, 2021)
[hereinafter Assessments]. PIAs are not without their challenges. See Kenneth A. Bamberger
& Deirdre K. Mulligan, PIA Requirements and Privacy Decision-Making in US Government
Agencies, in PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 225, 226, 230–35 (David Wright & Paul De Hert
eds., 2012).
26 DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 1 (2010),
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/privacy-impact-assessment-guidance.
27 See GDPR, supra note 12, art. 35.
28 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Says Hello to 1996 by Waving
Goodbye to Thousands of Administrative Orders that Are at Least 20 Years Old (Dec. 20,
1995), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1995/12/ftc-says-hello-1996-wavinggoodbye-thousands-administrative (noting both existing and future consent orders would
last twenty years); see also, e.g., Sony BMG Music Ent., 062-3019 F.T.C., 10 (June 28, 2007),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/06/0623019do070629.p
df (decision and order) (noting twenty-year time frame).
29 See Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to
Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1597–98 (2019) (noting that some of the
provisions of the GDPR are “deliberately vague” and become less vague over time with
interpretations from government agencies); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 13, at 625.
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lawyers or made available by government agencies.30 But vendor-designed
templates necessarily make legal conclusions, often without lawyers.
Assessment management vendors promise that their tools will automate
legal compliance beyond PIAs. Nymity, for example, offers a “software
solution for templating” to create an automated “privacy program . . . made
up of policies, procedures, and other accountability mechanisms.” 31 Its
templates are “60 percent complete, flexible to the needs” and business focus
of the company, making regulatory “compliance easy.”32 CyberSaint
marketed “audit-ready reports . . . that require no human effort to
produce.”33 AuraQuantic’s “GDPR Accelerator” calls itself an “All in 1”
complete compliance management tool with templates, logs, and systems
“with predesigned processes to comply with the regulation.” 34 And
Compliance Point promises that its OnePoint platform “enables
organizations to implement a unified approach to complying with . . .
HIPAA, . . . FISMA [(Federal Information Security Management Act)], . . .
Cyber Security Framework, GDPR, and more.” 35 Many other technology
vendors make similar guarantees. 36
It is easy to see how outsourcing assessment management requires
outsourcing legal interpretations. If reports are “audit-ready,” they have to

30 See IAPP & TRUSTARC, MEASURING PRIVACY OPERATIONS 12 (2018),
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/IAPP-Measuring-Privacy-OperationsFINAL.pdf [hereinafter MEASURING PRIVACY] (describing prevalence of Data Protection
Impact Assessments (DPIAs), which are very similar to PIAs).
31 NYMITY, 2018 PRIVACY COMPLIANCE SOFTWARE BUYER’S GUIDE 9 (2018),
https://info.nymity.com/hubfs/2018%20Privacy%20Compliance%20Software%20Buyers
%20Guide/Nymity-Buyers-Guide-GDPR-Edition.pdf?t=1525179547972 (suggesting that its
templating software will allow clients to create their privacy programs).
32 Interview with Paul Lewis, FIP, CIPM, CIPT, CIPP/C, CISSP, Senior Privacy Office
Solutions Advisor, Nymity, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 27, 2018) (notes on file with author).
33 Steven Bowcut, Automation and Visibility to Your Compliance and Risk Management
Program,
BRILLIANCE
SEC.
MAG.
(Apr.
2,
2020),
https://brilliancesecuritymagazine.com/compliance/automation-and-visibility-to-yourcompliance-and-risk-management-program/.
34 GDPR:
Accelerate
Compliance
in
Record
Time,
AURAQUANITC,
https://www.auraquantic.com/gdpr/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
35 OnePoint, COMPLIANCEPOINT, https://www.compliancepoint.com/onepoint (last
visited Apr. 24, 2021).
36 See, e.g., GDPR Compliance, MENTIS, https://www.mentisinc.com/gdprcompliance/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2021) (marketing its various platforms as compliant with
several
GDPR
provisions);
Case
Studies,
CROWNPEAK,
https://www.crownpeak.com/resources/case-studies/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2021) (listing a
diverse array of companies from Toyota to JAMS); Tag Monitoring and Management,
CROWNPEAK, https://www.crownpeak.com/products/monitoring-solutions/tag-auditorwith-trackermap (last visited Apr. 24, 2021) (Evidon (now Crownpeak) offering website
tracking to comply with GDPR, CalOPPA, and other statutes, among other tools); The
Consent
Solution
for
Enterprise-Grade
Digital
Experiences,
CROWNPEAK,
https://www.crownpeak.com/products/consent-solutions/universal-consent-platform
(last visited Apr. 24, 2021) (noting consent solutions say they “ensur[e]” compliance).
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include the kinds of questions regulators require of independent audits.
Systems that “comply with regulations” have to understand what those
regulations actually require. And any platform that regularly updates a
company’s compliance status requires a benchmark of what constitutes
compliance in the first place. Therefore, although these technologies are not
overtly offering legal advice like outside counsel, they are nevertheless
embedded with particular assumptions and interpretations of legal rules.
B. Consent Managers
The eighty-two vendors that offer consent management software can
track and record user affirmative consent.37 To effectively assist with
compliance, however, these tools have to be coded to recognize, distinguish,
and obtain the different kinds of legal consents—explicit,38 unambiguous,39
verifiable,40 written and informed,41 and so forth—all of which have
(different) legal definitions. After all, notice-and-consent remains at the
foundation of privacy law in the United States. And although scholars have
argued that the GDPR is not a consent-based statute,42 consent is one of the
lawful bases on which companies can collect and process customer data. 43
The Data Protection Board and national data protection agencies have also
issued opinion documents detailing the factual indicia of valid consent.44 The
European Court of Justice has also issued rulings on the legitimacy of prechecked boxes for cookie consents. 45
Despite that complexity, vendors often sell themselves as comprehensive
consent solutions. PossibleNow collects express consent, cookie consent, and
other preferences and provides a paper trail to “ensur[e] compliance with”

37 See TECH VENDOR REPORT, supra note 11, at 5, 7.
38 See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 4052.5 (West 2020) (requiring explicit consent before
financial companies can share customer information); GDPR, supra note 12, art. 9(2)(a).
39 See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 12, art. 4(11) (consent must be unambiguous).
40 See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
§ 1303(b)(1)(A)(ii), 112 Stat. 2681-728, 2681-730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii)) (requiring “verifiable parental consent”).
41 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(c) (2020) (“A general authorization for the
release of medical records or medical information may not be construed as the informed
and written consent required by this [law].”).
42 See Meg Leta Jones & Margot E. Kaminski, An American’s Guide to the GDPR, 98
DENVER L. REV. 93, 106–12 (2020).
43 See GDPR, supra note 12, art. 6(1)(a).
44 EUR. DATA PROT. BD., GUIDELINES 05/2020 ON CONSENT UNDER REGULATION
2016/679,
¶¶ 11–105
(Version
1.1
ed.
2020),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_202005_consent_e
n.pdf.
45 See, e.g., Case C-673/17, Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und
Verbraucherverbände–Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband eV v. Planet 49 GmbH,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:801, ¶ 65 (Oct. 1, 2019) (concluding that a pre-checked checkbox does
not constitute valid consent for information storage in the form of cookies).
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the GDPR, CCPA, Do Not Call, and other privacy laws and regulations. 46
Consentua and Consentric, both consent managers, make the same type of
promises. The former assures customers that its “platform surpasses GDPR
requirements.”47 The latter states that it “aligns with existing data privacy
regulation,” a legal conclusion about its software. 48 Again, these statements
may be marketing gimmicks; it is difficult to determine if Consetua’s software
does indeed go above and beyond the GDPR’s rules. But either way, vendors
are designing software to meet or exceed their interpretations of legal
requirements.
C. Incident Response
Incident response platforms provided by sixty-three vendors can help
companies respond to data breaches swiftly and with proper notice, 49 as
required by the GDPR50 and statutes in every state in the United States. 51
There are two types of vendors in this space. Companies like Proofpoint
position themselves as technological resources to stay ahead of and respond
to digital threats. They don’t make promises about regulatory compliance. 52
Other vendors make legal conclusions about their tools and guarantee legal
compliance as part of technical incident response. Resilient, for example,
states that its Privacy Module guides clients “through the correct response to
data loss incidents, helping to meet the regulatory deadlines” and other
GDPR requirements.53 It tells clients which authorities to notify, “how they
should be notified, and what information is required,” and provides their own
proprietary templates for those purposes. 54 Radar, which provides data
breach incident response management, states that it “generates an incident
specific response plan and notification guidelines according to federal, state,
and international laws” and “provides all the required documentation to

46 Compliance and Privacy, POSSIBLENOW, https://www.possiblenow.com/privacycompliance.php (last visited Apr. 24, 2021); see California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA),
POSSIBLENOW, https://www.possiblenow.com/california-consumer-privacy-act (last visited
Apr.
24,
2021);
Do
Not
Call
Compliance—DNCSolution,
POSSIBLENOW,
https://www.possiblenow.com/do-not-call-compliance (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
47 CONSENTUA, https://consentua.com/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
48 Consentric, MYLIFE DIGITAL, https://mylifedigital.co.uk/consent-preferencemanagement/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
49 See TECH VENDOR REPORT, supra note 11, at 5, 9–10.
50 See GDPR, supra note 12, art. 33(1) (requiring notification to national data
protection authorities within seventy-two hours of a data breach).
51 See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (July 17,
2020),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.
52 See PROOFPOINT, https://www.proofpoint.com/us (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
53 RESILIENT, BREACH NOTIFICATION UNDER THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION
REGULATION: NEW CAPABILITIES IN THE IBM RESILIENT INCIDENT RESPONSE PLATFORM
(2018), https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/9WYZP24P (emphasis added).
54 Id.
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support the organization’s burden of proof obligation under the breach
laws.”55 To do that, though, Resilient and Radar have to code interpretations
of the law into those guidelines, recommendations, and templates.
D. De-Identification Software
Software from forty-six companies purports to allow organizations to
process personal data safely in compliance56 with various state,57 national,58
and international statutes59 that require data anonymity or pseudonymity. But
these laws leave room for interpretation: engineers at these vendors decide
both the kind of anonymization used and the subset of data to which it
applies. Arcad Software, for example, says that its “DOT Anonymizer” is
“[d]esigned to meet the strictest requirements of the GDPR” by “hiding or
anonymizing the personal elements of data.”60 But that requires coding for
what a law defines as “personal elements,” a process the company does not
explain. Similarly, when Truata claims its service offers its customers a way to
meet the GDPR’s high anonymity threshold to process, analyze, and “extract
value” from anonymized data,61 it is necessarily translating a legal
requirement into coding language.
II.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF OUTSOURCING PRIVACY COMPLIANCE

Future research may provide a richer and more detailed picture of the
promises and reality of the privacy technology vendor market. Suffice it to

55 Radar
Incident
Response
Management
Software,
RADARFIRST,
https://www.radarfirst.com/resources/product-info/radar-datasheet/ (last visited Apr. 24,
2021); see also Simplify Compliance with GDPR Breach Notification Obligations, RADARFIRST,
https://www.radarfirst.com/gdpr (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
56 See TECH VENDOR REPORT, supra note 11, at 5, 9.
57 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020) (defining “[p]ersonal
information” as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of
being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular
consumer or household”).
58 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, § 264, 110 Stat. 1936, 2033–34 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.); see also Paul Ohm,
Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1701, 1736–38 (2010) (discussing how HIPAA’s Privacy Rule was promulgated
alongside a strong “faith in the power of anonymization” to protect personal information).
59 The GDPR applies to “personal data,” which is “any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier
such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or
more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity of that natural person.” GDPR, supra note 12, art. 4(1); see also id., recital 25.
60 ARCAD
SOFTWARE,
PROTECTION
OF
PERSONAL
DATA,
https://www.arcadsoftware.com/resource-items/white-paper-dot-anonymizer/ (last visited
Apr. 24, 2021).
61 See TECH VENDOR REPORT, supra note 11, at 160.
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say, however, that at least some of these 259 vendors are including in their
technologies their own interpretations of legal requirements. For the most
part, the IAPP sees the growth of privacy technology vendors as a good thing:
privacy professionals “can now shop among dozens of vendors to find
solutions to challenges created” by the GDPR and other laws. 62 The
organization has a financial interest in saying that. Many of the IAPP’s
conferences are sponsored by privacy tech vendors: the IAPP’s 2020 Summit
Sessions, for example, were principally sponsored by OneTrust Data
Discovery, TrustArc, Cisco, BigID, OneTrust Vendorpedia, and WireWheel,
all privacy technology vendors on the market. 63 Moreover, the IAPP’s
comments speak to the advantage of having many market participants, not
the value and effectiveness of an industry where engineers make legal
conclusions. Indeed, the implications of that kind of outsourcing to
technology are troubling. It threatens to amplify the power of the largest
technology companies at the expense of their smaller competitors while also
narrowing privacy law, undermining expertise, and eroding accountability. 64
This section describes each of those risks in turn.
A. Power Asymmetries
Outsourcing is often cheaper than building something internally, the
latter of which requires in-house technical expertise, large salaries and
benefits for new hires, and institutional time and capacity. 65 Indeed, as the
IAPP and TrustArc recently found, budgetary constraints likely explain why
many companies have neither conducted nor hired anyone to help with data
mapping, data inventories, or privacy impact assessments despite GDPR
requirements.66
Even for those companies in the technology vendor market, size, and
budget matter. Hiring vendors requires legwork: a clear set of goals, ongoing
relationship maintenance, employee training, technology assessment, and
integrating the technology into the company practice and routine. 67 Denise
Farnsworth, then Jazz Pharmaceuticals CPO, recommended first “go[ing]
through the regulations and statutes that are relevant to your company, then
you determine the thing you need to comply with” before hiring a vendor. 68

62 IAPP, 2018 PRIVACY TECH VENDOR REPORT 16 (V.2.4e ed. 2018),
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/2018TechVendorReport.pdf [hereinafter
2018 TECH VENDOR REPORT].
63 See IAPP Summit Sessions, IAPP, https://iapp.org/conference/virtualsessions/summit-sessions/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
64 This list excludes some obvious risks associated with new technologies, including
post-release bugs and failures, that may expose the company to even greater risk.
65 See 2018 TECH VENDOR REPORT, supra note 62, at 18–19.
66 See MEASURING PRIVACY, supra note 30, at 4, 7–8, 11 (reporting on results of survey
of 496 privacy professionals).
67 See 2018 TECH VENDOR REPORT, supra note 62, at 16–18.
68 Id. at 17.
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Anick Fortin-Cousens, then CPO of IBM Canada, noted that vendor
management is “a big job for the vendor and for the purchasing company.
Implementation involves a lot of back and forth. It’s a real partnership and
requires assigned resources on the part of the vendor and customer. We had
daily and weekly interactions . . . .”69 And once the vendor’s product is up and
running, there’s more work to be done, including training and integrating
the use of the product into the corporate culture.70 All of that takes time and
money, two things that small companies and startups don’t have.
Larger companies can leverage internal expertise to conduct extensive
due diligence, beta testing, and background research on potential vendors.
They can leverage superior bargaining power to adapt vendor products to
their interests. They can even buy the best products, leaving the rest of the
market with inferior choices or just more expensive ones. And given that
these technologies embody legal interpretations, the advantages of size and
scale will allow large companies to build structures that frame the law in ways
that benefit them, not their competitors and consumers. 71
B. Narrowing Privacy Law
These concerns alone should give privacy professionals pause. But even
more systemic dangers are looming. Outsourcing compliance to technology
vendors may narrow and limit privacy protections for users in two different
ways. First, translating privacy law into technology platforms reduces privacy
law to its codable pieces. Some privacy compliance technologies, therefore,
embody an epistemic error: they assume that privacy law is reducible to factors
that AI can identify. It isn’t.72 Privacy also involves managing users’
expectations, their desire for obscurity, 73 their need for trust,74 and their
69 Id. at 22.
70 Id. at 25.
71 See Waldman, Privacy Law’s, supra note 8, at 797–98.
72 Scholars recognize that not everything can be coded, especially when it comes to
persons and data. See, e.g., Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self:
From Agnostic to Agonistic Machine Learning, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 83, 85 (2019)
(recognizing that there are elements of the human self not computable); see also BRETT
FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 29–34 (2018) (arguing that AI
solutions to social problems transforms humans into mere “cogs” in the wheel); Benjamin
W. Cramer, To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism, 4 J. INFO. POL.
173, 173 (2014) (reviewing EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE
FOLLY OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM (2013) (coining the term “technological
solutionism” to describe the approach that everything has an engineering solution)). See
generally JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET (2010) (discussing the dehumanizing
effects of solely technical solutions).
73 See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of Obscurity, 72 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1343, 1345–46 (2015).
74 See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 434 (2016). See generally ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST:
INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE (2018) [hereinafter WALDMAN, PRIVACY
AS TRUST].
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consistent distaste for transfers of data to third parties, 75 not just paper trails
and data maps. Even the best technology products cannot capture all of that.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, privacy technology vendors
recast the GDPR’s focus from reducing privacy risks for the consumer to
reducing the risk that the company will face investigation and litigation. 76
ZLTech, for example, markets its “GDPR-Ready Solutions” as ways to avoid
“the risk of unprecedented sanctions.” 77 And Clarip, a software-as-service
provider, bills itself as “the next generation . . . data privacy platform that
helps brands minimize privacy risks.”78 Ethyca puts “[d]ata [p]rivacy” and
“[r]isk [m]anagement” together and wants to automate privacy “with no loss
in efficiency.”79 And the compliance assistance company, 2BAdvice, wants to
show its clients how “to save time and money and minimize risk through
automating processes.”80 These are just a few examples. Risk avoidance is a
trope in the privacy technology vendor market: of the 259 companies profiled
in the IAPP’s 2019 Privacy Technology Vendor Report, seventy-nine of them
describe their risk mitigation work in terms of reducing corporate risk; only
four talk about minimizing privacy risks to customers.81
Framing the data privacy landscape as one based on corporate risk is not
surprising. Some argue that risk framing can actually encourage compliance
with the law by persuading executives to treat it as a high priority, especially
when some executives still see privacy as inconsistent with corporate profit
goals.82 The risk of a fine of four percent of global revenue under the GDPR
could also go a long way to making privacy compliance a central corporate
mission.83 Risk framing also makes sense from an endogenous political
perspective. By emphasizing the dangers of noncompliance, privacy
professionals stake out important territory at the highest levels of corporate
decisionmaking, giving them seats at the table and the capacity to influence
policy.84 This can also encourage third-party vendors seeking corporate
contracts to follow suit because it allows them to market themselves as sharing
the same values as their corporate clients.
75 See Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy Interests in Public Records: An
Empirical Investigation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 131–34 (2017).
76 See Waldman, Privacy Law’s, supra note 8, at 798–803.
77 ZLTECH, GDPR-READY SOLUTIONS (on file with author).
78 Clarip is the Next Generation SaaS Data Privacy Platform that Helps Brands Minimize
Privacy Risks and Engage Customers Better, CLARIP, https://www.clarip.com/business (last
visited Apr. 24, 2021).
79 Our Mission: To Build Trust in the Internet & Data-Driven Business, ETHYCA,
https://ethyca.com/about-ethyca/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
80 See 2BADVICE, https://www.2b-advice.com/en/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
81 See TECH VENDOR REPORT, supra note 11, at 28–172 (data is based on the language
this subset of companies included in the Tech Vendor Report).
82 See Kaminski, supra note 29, at 1603–05 (suggesting that overtime, having to
complete assessments and other compliance documents will normalize the process and
integrate privacy into everyday work).
83 GDPR, supra note 12, arts. 58, 83.
84 See EDELMAN, supra note 9, at 97–98.
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But risk framing is problematic if the goal is adherence to the substantive
goals of privacy law. It is incomplete. There is more to privacy than managing
risks of a lawsuit. Operating along narrow risk-mitigation paths distracts
corporate attention from more important, substantive mandates and focuses
employees squarely on their employers’ interests. Framing privacy obligations
in terms of corporate risk focuses only on the avoidance of a corporate
problem rather than the achievement of an affirmative social goal—namely,
greater user privacy and safety and limits on the collection and processing of
personal data. In a regulatory context where lawsuits are nearly impossible
and regulatory oversight is spotty at best, recasting the GDPR’s attention to
risk undermines the law’s ability to effectuate real change in corporate
behavior and technology design. So, although a few scholars have suggested
that some privacy professionals see the law’s requirements as a floor for their
work,85 other social forces on the ground are pulling in the opposite
direction.86
C. Erosion of Expertise
Outsourcing legal decisions to engineers is a threat to the role of
expertise in society.
Many technology vendors are coding their
interpretations of legal requirements into their products, offering them as
solutions to legal problems. That work often happens without lawyers.
Advanced Metadata, for example, makes much of its “[twenty] years of
experience in data science and information management,” but not one of its
eight executive team members focuses on regulatory issues.87 CipherCloud,
which provides cloud-based data mapping, hosted a webinar in which its
senior vice president of strategy and alliances and its vice president of
marketing, neither of whom are privacy professionals or privacy lawyers,
claimed that the company’s cloud-based tools can help reach GDPR
compliance “with [f]our [k]ey [c]apabilities.”88 That is a legal conclusion
made by salespersons. Making legal conclusions without legal expertise, and
burying those conclusions into code, risks making bad products. Further, it
also constitutes a threat to the legal and privacy professions by implicitly
characterizing the skills of legal interpretation and implementation as

85 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 265 (2011).
86 Elsewhere, I explained in more detail how the systems of compliance that CPOs put
in place belie any professed interest in going above and beyond the requirements of privacy
law. See generally Waldman, Privacy Law’s, supra note 8, at 805.
87 See ADVANCED METADATA, http://metricsinthemist.com/amd_web/index.html
(last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
88 See
Navigate
GDPR
with
Four
Key
Capabilities,
CIPHERCLOUD,
https://www.ciphercloud.com/webinars/why-do-you-need-a-casb-8/ (last visited Apr. 24,
2021).
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routinizable, irrational, imperfect, or just too human. 89 As Frank Pasquale has
argued, the notion that any engineer, entrepreneur, or businessperson can
neatly code privacy law and the human judgments and negotiations it
demands, into a machine loses the “[q]ualitative evaluation and . . . humble
willingness to recalibrate and risk-adjust quantitative data” that comes with
human experts.90
D. Lack of Accountability
Privacy technology vendors also change the discourse of power. The
language we use shapes our understanding and perceptions of legitimacy,
reality, and legality.91 As Michel Foucault argued, “[d]iscourse transmits and
produces power.”92 Critical race theorists have made similar arguments about
the power of speech.93 As have feminist scholars.94 Our social understanding
of privacy is written and discussed in a variety of ways, but through the noise,
the discourse is accessible to consumers: “anonymity” protects people from
the effects of revelation, 95 we want more “control” over our information, 96 and

89 See ADAM GREENFIELD, RADICAL TECHNOLOGIES: THE DESIGN OF EVERYDAY LIFE
190–207 (2017); Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal
Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 19–32 (2019) (challenging the view that contracts and
legal provisions can be coded).
90 Frank Pasquale, Professional Judgment in an Era of Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning, BOUNDARY 2, Feb. 2019, at 73, 74.
91 See Linda J. Nicholson, Introduction, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 1, 11 (Linda J.
Nicholson ed., 1990) (“[C]onceptual distinctions, criteria of legitimation, cognitive
procedural rules, and so forth are all political and therefore represent moves of power . . .
[though] they represent a different type of power than is exhibited in, for example, physical
violence or the threat of force.”).
92 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 101 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978);
see also Gerald Turkel, Michel Foucault: Law, Power, and Knowledge, 17 J.L. & SOC’Y 170, 172
(1990) (describing Foucault’s argument on “discourses of domination”).
93 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 444 (“[R]acist speech constructs the social reality that
constrains the liberty of non-whites because of their race.”); see also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS,
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 61 (1991) (arguing that we live with the legacy of slavery
in part through “powerful and invisibly reinforcing structures of thought, language, and
law”).
94 See, e.g., MARGARET THORNTON, DISSONANCE AND DISTRUST: WOMEN IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1996) (using real world examples of female lawyers to argue that Foucault’s
discourse of power is fundamentally a gendered dynamic).
95 This is particularly helpful for members of marginalized and stigmatized
communities. See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U.L. REV. 159, 162
(2015) (arguing that privacy should be understood as preventing intimate information
from serving as the basis of discrimination).
96 See JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56 (1992) (privacy is
“control over a realm of intimacy”); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967)
(defining privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others”).
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we “trust” our friends to keep our secrets. 97 Shifting that discourse into the
language of technology—binary code, source code, “black box” algorithms 98
protected by trade secrecy,99 emergent and intelligent machines 100—
empowers technologists as the new governors of society and the dictators of
social control. This disempowers consumers, who have no access to a
technology-driven privacy discourse.
It also undermines the promise of privacy law to hold companies
accountable. Privacy technologies embody particular visions of what privacy
laws require. But the design process where that instantiation occurs is almost
entirely hidden to us. If regulators ever hope to hold technology companies
accountable for misusing our data, they will need more than just a vendor
contract to do it. As Danielle Citron has argued, the tendency to shift legal
decisions to automated technologies erases the safeguards guaranteed by due
process, leaving consumers unprotected. 101 The more we ask “black box”
algorithms to implement the law, the more we undermine the project of
public governance.102

97 See WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST, supra note 74, at 51–52 (noting that trust allows
us to share because it creates expectations of confidentiality and adherence to norms).
98 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 8 (2015).
99 There is a growing literature on the role of trade secrecy in keeping algorithms
hidden from users. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014) (algorithms are “shrouded in
secrecy”); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal
Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1349–53 (2018) (arguing that trade secrecy should not
be privileged in criminal proceedings, especially where automated systems are being used
to take away liberty). The arguments are being made in court. See, e.g., State v. Loomis,
881 N.W.2d 749, 757 (Wis. 2016).
100 Some scholars note that the discourse of AI is inherently hidden from us. See, e.g.,
Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic
Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 186–90 (2017) (explaining why transparency would not
help ordinary users understand automated decision making algorithms); see also Julie Brill,
Former Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Transparency, Trust, and Consumer Protection in
a Complex World, Keynote Address Before Coalition for Networked Information 8–9 (Dec.
15,
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/895843/151216cnikeyn
ote.pdf (former FTC Commissioner, Julie Brill, noting difficulties in making algorithms
transparent, calling on companies to address fairness themselves).
101 See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U.L. REV. 1249, 1253–
56 (2008).
102 See, e.g., Hous. Fed’n of Tchrs. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168,
1180 (2017) (concluding that the use of a proprietary algorithm to determine teacher
hiring, contract renewal, and promotion gave teachers “no meaningful way to ensure
correct calculation of their . . . scores, and as a result [we]re unfairly subject to mistaken
deprivation of constitutionally protected property interests in their jobs”).
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CONCLUSION
Companies in the information industry are fond of telling us that our
privacy is important to them. And yet, managerializing privacy compliance
suggests otherwise. A company that outsources privacy compliance to
technology vendors is arguably conceding that privacy is not one of its “core
competencies.” Core business practices are done in house, not farmed out to
automated systems chosen for their efficiency and their capacity to do their
work without disrupting productivity and innovation. It is, of course, possible
that a company may see privacy outsourcing more like hiring outside counsel
than contracting with vendors to, say, cater meetings and lunches. But by
choosing code over human expertise, those companies that hire privacy
technology vendors are risking privacy compliance that is narrow and
incomplete.
Information industry executives can take that risk because our regulatory
institutions have ceded their governance responsibilities to regulated entities
and chosen managerial values as their lodestars. As Cohen has argued,
managerial regulators prefer light regulatory touches, adopt industry
discourses about law and innovation, and conceptualize their jobs not as
consumer advocates but as facilitators of corporate innovation. Privacy
outsourcing is part of a larger problem of public and private governance in
informational capitalism, a symptom of a system in which law and technology
have been leveraged to entrench corporate power rather than contain it.

